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In a recent book entitled Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of 
the Transcendental Argument for Freedom, Robert Lockie argues 
that the belief in determinism is self-defeating. Lockie’s argument 
hinges on the contention that we are bound to assess whether our 
beliefs are justified by relying on an internalist deontological 
conception of justification. However, the determinist denies the 
existence of the free will that is required in order to form justified 
beliefs according to such deontological conception of justification. 
As a result, by the determinist’s own lights, the very belief in 
determinism cannot count as justified. On this ground Lockie argues 
that we are bound to act and believe on the presupposition that we 
are free. In this paper I discuss and reject Lockie’s transcendental 
argument for freedom. Lockie’s argument relies on the assumption 
that in judging that determinism is true the determinist is committed 
to take it that there are epistemic obligations – e.g., the obligation 
to believe that determinism is true, or the obligation to aim to believe 
the truth about determinism. I argue that this assumption rests on a 
wrong conception of the interplay between judgments and 
commitments. 
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There is a long and rich tradition of arguments attempting to show that to 
believe in determinism is somehow self-defeating or self-refuting.1 These 
arguments articulate in various ways the insight expressed by Epicurus in 
this oft-quoted passage: 
 
The man who says that all things come to pass by necessity 
cannot criticize one who denies that all things come to pass 
by necessity; for he admits that this too happens of necessity. 
(Epicurus 1926, 113) 
 
In a recent book entitled Free Will and Epistemology. A Defence of the 
Transcendental Argument for Freedom, Robert Lockie revives this 
tradition by defending his own version of the Epicurean argument against 
determinism.2 
 
Lockie’s argument is called the ‘indirect epistemic transcendental 
argument for freedom’ (hereafter ‘IETAF’). IETAF hinges on the 
contention that we are bound to assess whether our beliefs are justified by 
relying on an internalist deontological conception of justification. 3 
However, the determinist denies the existence of the free will which is 
required in order to form justified beliefs according to such deontological 
conception of justification. As a result, by the determinist’s own lights, the 
very belief in determinism cannot count as justified.  
 
This argument doesn’t prove that determinism is false. Rather, it shows 
that a determinist can’t hold her view in a coherent manner. On this ground 
Lockie argues for a view he calls presuppositional incompatibilism, i.e., 
the view that we are bound to act and believe on the presupposition that we 
possess the kind of freedom defended by incompatibilists, namely the kind 
of freedom that is needed in order to fulfil our epistemic obligations. 
 
 
1 See Jordan (1969, 48) for a list of defenders of epicurean arguments before 1969. See 
Knaster (1986) for a list of defenders of epicurean arguments before 1986. Recent 
influential discussions include Honderich (1990a; 1990b) and, most recently, Slagle (2016) 
and Lockie (2018). See Honderich (1990a, 361ff) for eight different versions of the 
Epicurean argument from self-defeat. The indirect epistemic transcendental argument for 
freedom is only one of the many arguments that took inspiration from Epicurus’s quote. 
2 Lockie’s argument is similar in many respects to the one defended in Boyle, Grisez, and 
Tollefsen (1976). 
3  Throughout this paper I am concerned with epistemic justification only, and with 
deontological views that countenance the existence of epistemic obligations only. 
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The aim of this paper is to explain why IETAF fails to deliver the 
conclusion that determinism is self-defeating.4   
 
In §2 I clarify Lockie’s IETAF and argue that it relies on the following 
crucial contention:  
 
Determinist’s Commitment to Epistemic Obligations (CommitmentEO): 
In judging that determinism is true the determinist is thereby committed to 
take it that there are epistemic obligations.  
 
In §3 I discuss Lockie’s own preferred version of internalist epistemic 
deontologism, i.e., the view that justification is to be understood in terms 
of the fulfilment of one’s perceived epistemic obligations. Crucially, 
Lockie endorses doxastic involuntarism – i.e., the claim that we have no 
direct voluntary control over the formation of our beliefs – and on this 
ground he is bound to reject the existence of doxastic obligations, that is, 
epistemic obligations about what to believe. However, he argues that we 
possess the relevant freedom that underpins what I shall call cognitive 
obligations, that is, epistemic obligations concerning how to manage one’s 
own cognitive activities in inquiry.  
 
In §§4-5 I introduce Lockie’s transcendental argument for the 
ineliminability of deontological appraisal (or ‘ineliminability argument’, 
hereafter ‘IA’). IA is meant to play a crucial dialectical role in Lockie’s 
defence of IETAF. However, I argue that IA doesn’t provide any 
motivation for CommitmentEO and that as a result the defender of IETAF 
is left with the burden to provide grounds for CommitmentEO.   
 
In §§6-7 I distinguish and evaluate three different versions of 
CommitmentEO. I argue that they are all false, and that their prima facie 
plausibility, if any, might be captured by structurally analogous claims that 
do not involve a commitment to epistemic obligations of any sort.  
 
In §8 I conclude by locating Lockie’s IETAF within the literature on 
modest and ambitious transcendental arguments, and through that 
comparison I argue that the use of modest transcendental arguments in the 






4 This paper elaborates some of the remarks I have made in my review of Lockie’s book. 
See Zanetti (2019). 
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2. The Indirect Epistemic Transcendental Argument for Freedom 
 
Lockie’s IETAF can be summarized as follows5 (where by ‘justificationID’ 
and cognate expressions I refer to epistemic justification as understood 
according to an internalist deontological notion of justification).  
  
P1)  If determinism is true, then no-one can do otherwise.  
P2)  The ability to reason otherwise is necessary for someone to be 
held unjustifiedID.  
P3)  If determinism is true, then no-one may be held unjustifiedID.  
P4)  If no-one may be held unjustifiedID, then no-one 
is justifiedID either.  
P5)  If no-one is ever justifiedID, then belief in determinism is 
not justifiedID either.  
C)  If determinism is true, then belief in determinism is 
not justifiedID.  
  
Lockie comments on the conclusion of the argument as follows:   
  
I take it that this would be a wholly unsustainable position for 
the determinist to be in – that the determinist simply must 
resist the conclusion of this argument. (Lockie 2018, 183)  
  
But why should this conclusion trouble the determinist? After all, the 
determinist’s worldview rejects the existence of the sort of freedom that is 
needed in order to underpin epistemic obligations. Moreover, the 
determinist can grant that the very belief in determinism is not justifiedID, 
and yet she can insist that her belief is justified according to other non-
deontological notions of justification (whether internalist or externalist). 
The determinist can argue that her belief is based on good evidential 
grounds, and she can also claim that it has been formed through a suitably 
reliable belief-forming process. Thus, the argument as it stands doesn’t 
show that determinism is self-defeating.  
  
The argument provides grounds for concluding that determinism is self-
defeating if we add the following two premises:   
  
Monist Epistemic Deontologism (MED): a deontological conception of 
justification is the sole correct account of epistemic justification.   
  
 
5 See Lockie (2018, 182-183) for more details on the argument’s overall structure and the 
motivation for the main premises.  
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Judgment’s Commitment to Epistemic Justification (CommitmentEJ): 
in judging that p one is thereby committed to take it that there is a 
justification for judging that p.6  
  
By judging that determinism is true, the determinist is committed to take it 
that her very judgment in determinism is justified (via CommitmentEJ); but 
since epistemic justification has to be understood in deontological terms 
only (MED), by judging that determinism is true the determinist is thereby 
committed to take it that her judgment in determinism is justifiedED; and 
yet, by judging that determinism is true, she is also committed to the claim 
that the judgment in determinism is not justifiedID (via P1-P5). Thus, by 
judging that determinism is true the determinist is committed to 
incompatible commitments: that there are no justifiedED judgments, and 
that judgment in determinism is justifiedED.  
  
The argument, as it stands, has few chances to be taken seriously by 
contemporary participants in the free will debate and in the debate on the 
nature of epistemic justification. First of all, the determinist has several 
options to reject the argument, most of which appeal to compatibilist 
approaches to the problem of free will. 7  But the most highly 
contentious – and widely rejected – premise is MED. If MED is false, then 
it is open for the determinist to argue that her belief in determinism is 
justified according to a non-deontological notion of justification, and thus 
the determinist can avoid the charge of being endorsing a self-defeating 
standpoint. MED could be rejected either by arguing that there is no notion 
of epistemic justification that has to be understood in deontological terms, 
or by arguing that even if some genuine notion of epistemic justification is 
captured by deontological accounts of justification, still there are other 
equally legitimate notions of justification that are not to be understood in 
deontological terms. Now, most epistemologists nowadays endorse non-
deontological accounts of justification. Moreover, the monist assumption 
according to which there is a single correct account of epistemic justification 
has recently been vigorously challenged, both by internalists and externalists.8 
This is why, as it stands, the argument is unlikely to attract serious 
consideration from contemporary philosophers.   
  
One of the chief merits of Lockie’s discussion of IETAF is that it attempts 
to defend it without relying on MED. Lockie actually rejects MED and 
endorses a pluralist stance in epistemology according to which there is a 
 
6 I won’t discuss this principle here. For a defence, see Smithies (2012). 
7 Lockie (2018) discusses many of them in Chapter 8. 




plurality of accounts of epistemic justification that capture equally 
important dimensions of epistemic evaluation.9 In particular, he makes 
room for an internalist deontological conception of justification, and an 
externalist (non-deontological) conception of justification. Lockie’s 
strategy consists in showing that even if the determinist’s belief is justified 
according to an externalist notion of justification, the determinist can’t 
occupy a coherent theoretical stance unless the belief in determinism is also 
justifiedED. Lockie’s remarks on the conclusion of his argument give us a hint 
that indicates the missing premise that puts pressure on the determinist:  
  
Determinists must be able to justify their position and oppose 
their opponents’ positions. The framework for such 
justification must be in place – no metaphysics can be so 
powerful, so totalizing, as to undermine it. (Lockie 2018, 
183)  
  
In claiming that “[d]eterminists must be able to justify their position and 
oppose their opponents’ positions”, Lockie seems to suggest that this 
justificatory ability involves the appeal to epistemic obligations. To a first 
approximation, by holding the determinist view, the determinist is 
willy nilly committed to the claim that the opponent ought to abandon her 
own view and endorse determinism. If a contention along these lines is 
correct, then the determinist can’t be content with a non-deontological (be 
that internalist or externalist) justification for her belief, for it is part of 
what it takes to justify one’s own position and to oppose the opponent’s 
position to hold that there are epistemic obligations of the sort posited by 
deontological accounts of justification. Thus, this is the crucial premise 
that Lockie needs in order to use IETAF to conclude that determinism is 
self-defeating:  
  
CommitmentEO: in judging determinism to be true, the determinist is 
committed to take it that there are epistemic obligations.   
  
Since a deontological conception of epistemic justification understands 
justification in terms of the satisfaction of epistemic obligations, a 
commitment to epistemic obligation is a commitment to the possibility 
of justifiedED beliefs. If we add CommitmentEO to premises P1-P5, we are 
then in a position to understand how IETAF is meant to yield the 
conclusion that determinism is self-defeating. In judging that determinism 
is true, the determinist is committed to take it that there are no epistemic 
obligations and thus no justifiedED beliefs (via P1-P5); and yet she is at the 
same time committed to take it that there are epistemic obligations 
 
9 See Lockie (2018, chap. 2). 
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(CommitmentEO), and in particular that her own judgment in determinism 
fulfils one such obligation and thus counts as justifiedED (via CommitmentEJ).  
  
It is clear from Lockie’s discussion of IETAF that IA is supposed to 
provide a motivation for CommitmentEO.10 In what follows I shall argue 
that IA doesn’t provide any motivation for CommitmentEO but rather relies 
on it. I shall also distinguish and reject three different interpretations 
of CommitmentEO. On this ground, I will conclude that IETAF fails to 
show that determinism is self-defeating.  Before coming to the critical evaluation 
IA and CommitmentEO, I shall discuss Lockie’s own preferred version of 




3. Lockie’s Epistemic Deontologism 
 
There is one well-known objection against epistemic deontologism. 
According to Alston (1988), we have epistemic obligations to believe only 
if we have direct voluntary control over the formation of our beliefs, but 
since we lack this control we have no such epistemic obligations.   
  
Lockie himself endorses doxastic involuntarism, i.e., the claim that we do 
not possess direct voluntary control over the formation of our beliefs. 
However, he addresses Alston’s objection by making two moves: by 
shifting the focus of epistemic obligations from belief to the whole process 
of inquiry that culminates with the (involuntary) formation of belief; and 
by arguing that we do possess the kind of freedom that is required to 
underpin these obligations.   
  
Lockie doesn’t offer a detailed account of our epistemic obligations, but 
we can appreciate what he thinks about the issue by considering the 
following paradigmatic case of deontological appraisal:  
  
Envisage a detective who has, throughout his police career, 
demonstrated a poor attitude, being lazy, egotistical, lacking 
due diligence, lacking moral seriousness and possessing a 
laissez-faire approach to his professional duties. […] Through 
assiduous flattery and unctuous professional networking, our 
detective becomes lead investigator in a murder investigation, 
where he fails to seal the crime scene early enough, he cross-
 
10 See Lockie’s first option among the moves that are available to the determinist to reject 
the argument. The move consists in showing that “epistemic normativity is not to be 
understood on the model of ‘oughts’” (Lockie 2018, 184).  
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contaminates the storage of DNA evidence and he fails to 
systematically track down, cross-reference and record the 
relevant witness statements. He also fails to study the witness 
statements and forensic evidence with sufficient rigour and 
intricacy, or think carefully and systematically enough about 
the evidence and the unfolding investigation in the way he has 
been trained throughout his police career. He believes what 
he subsequently believes (‘suspect x did it!’) with sincere 
conviction – but he is unjustified (deontically) because of his 
deplorable cognitive conduct, his wholesale epistemic 
irresponsibility. Let us suppose his late-stage final processes 
of belief formation and fixation (say, the micro-cognitive 
processes that occur subsequent to his poor conduct, 
intellectual or otherwise) are entirely involuntary; still, he is 
epistemically unjustified in a strongly deontic sense. (Lockie 
2018, 47-8)   
  
With this case in mind, we can distinguish between two kinds of epistemic 
obligations and clarify the scope of Lockie’s view.  
  
Doxastic obligations are those obligations that concern what subjects 
ought to believe – as in the case in which one ought to judge that p, say, 
where p follows from truths believed by the subject and the subject knows 
that p follows from them. 11  According to Alston’s objection, these 
obligations exist only if we possess the kind of voluntary control over the 
formation of belief which is denied by doxastic involuntarism. Since 
Lockie is a doxastic involuntarist, Lockie’s deontologism is bound to 
reject the existence of doxastic obligations.  
  
In fact, the detective case does not feature doxastic obligations, but rather 
what we might call cognitive obligations, that is, obligations that concern 
the way in which subjects ought to conduct their cognitive activities for the 
sake of inquiry – as in the case of the obligation to be systematic and 
careful in one’s search for evidence, say.12 Although we don’t have the 
freedom that is required to underpin doxastic obligations, Lockie argues 
 
11 The choice of this principle is just for illustrative purposes. I am not concerned here with 
the content of specific epistemic obligations, but with the general contention that there are 
epistemic obligations at all and that these are presupposed in the activity of judging.  
12 These obligations are sometimes described in the literature as ‘intellectual obligations’. 
See Alston (1988) for a characterization of intellectual obligations. For more on this topic 
and the varieties of epistemic deontologism, see Vahid (1998), Nottelmann (2013), and 
Peels (2017). In this paper, I prefer to distinguish between doxastic and cognitive 
obligations in order to leave it an open question whether Lockie’s favoured obligations are 
what Alston and others have described as intellectual obligations. 
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that we do have the freedom that is required in order to fulfil cognitive 
obligations of the sort described in the detective case.   
  
With these clarifications in mind, we can turn to IA. 
 
 
4. Deontological Appraisal as Ineliminable 
 
As I understand IA, its aim is to establish the following thesis:  
   
Ineliminability deontological appraisal [IDA]: We are bound to 
presuppose that we have some epistemic obligations.13  
  
According to IDA, deontological appraisal is ineliminable not so much 
because there are some epistemic obligations; rather, deontological 
appraisal is ineliminable because we are bound to presuppose that there are 
some epistemic obligations.   
  
Lockie considers two ways in which one can argue for the eliminability of 
deontological appraisal. One is to hold that our “epistemic obligations may 
be so limited as to be uninteresting”.14 Deontological appraisal would be 
eliminable on that view because its scope of application would so limited 
as to be uninteresting. This is the weaker challenge to his view, and Lockie 
has two responses to it which do not require the appeal to IA.15   
  
According to the second way of eliminating epistemic deontologism “the 
entire framework of [deontological] internalist justification is abandoned 
for the entire framework of externalist epistemic value”.16 This is the kind 
of challenge to which IA is supposed to provide an answer. This challenge 
can in turn be understood in at least two relevant ways:   
 
13 Although I present IA as an argument for the ineliminability of deontological appraisal, 
Lockie presents it as an argument for the ineliminability of internalism, or as a 
transcendental argument against a totalizing externalism. However, Lockie makes clear in 
several occasions (e.g., Lockie 2018, 28) that by ‘internalism’ he refers to the internalist 
deontological conception of justification. Moreover, Lockie also says (e.g., Lockie 2018, 
118) that he prefers to deploy his argument in connection with obligations in particular, 
rather than in connection with internalism in general, although he eventually also presents 
an argument for the ineliminability of a non-deontological form of access internalism. 
14 Lockie (2018, 115). 
15 The first response is that we do in fact possess a significant amount of control over our 
cognition (Lockie 2018, chap. 4). The second response is that “However limited our agency 
and access may seem when considered from without, considered from within an epistemic 
perspective these are all the resources we have; and any limitations of these resources will 
leave unaffected the importance of doing the best we can” (Lockie 2018, 117) 




1. Deontological appraisal might be abandoned because one 
discovers that epistemology has nothing to do with deontology, or 
that justification is not to be understood in deontological terms. 
One way of pressing this objection against Lockie is by arguing 
that cognitive obligations are not genuinely epistemic, or that they 
have nothing to do with epistemic justification.17  
  
2. Another way of reading the claim about the complete elimination 
of deontological appraisal is to take it as the claim that we lack the 
kind of control that is required to underpin our supposed epistemic 
obligations. This challenge is precisely the one that the determinist 
is raising: by arguing for determinism, the determinist is in a 
position to argue that there are no epistemic obligations.  
  
With these clarifications in mind, we can better appreciate the nature of IA. 
Its aim is to show that even if (1) and (2) are correct, still we are bound to 
proceed as if we had epistemic obligations. So, to illustrate with (2), which 
is the central case in the context of a transcendental argument against the 
determinist, even if it is true that we lack the freedom needed to underpin 




5. The Transcendental Argument for the Ineliminability of Deontological 
Appraisal  
 
What is the argument for IDA? Lockie first provides an argument for 
the ineliminability of a non-deontological form of access internalism and 
then extends this argument to deontological appraisal. The central insight 
of the argument is expressed by Lockie as follows:  
  
However limited psychological science shows us to be, we 
cannot be so limited as to undermine the ability of such 
scientists to uncover our limits, then recommend (pessimistic) 
conclusions for epistemology based on such discoveries. On 
the assumption that they must have access to the ground for 
maintaining how limited we are in our access, there must be 
a limit to those limits. (Lockie 2018, 118)  
 
17 This is a standard challenge to epistemic deontologist views that do not focus on doxastic 
obligations but on intellectual or cognitive obligations. See Alston (1988, sec. VII) for a 
version of the challenge. See Peels (2017) for an answer to Alston’s objection. See Lockie 
(2018, chap. 3) for his answer to this challenge. 
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 This passage suggests that there is at least one dimension of epistemic 
evaluation that is ineliminable, as it would always be possible to evaluate 
the epistemic credentials of our beliefs by checking the quality of our 
grounds for them. This internalist dimension of evaluation can’t be 
coherently rejected: however limited we end up to be, there must be 
some ground on the basis of which the objector claims that we are so 
limited, and thus the objector’s belief itself can be evaluated by checking 
whether her grounds are epistemically good enough.  
  
After presenting this argument, Lockie states that “[w]hat goes for access 
and control, goes for obligation”.18 His argument here is very compressed, 
but its crucial insight is captured by the following observation:   
  
It is indefensible to suppose we could abandon the last 
epistemic ‘ought’ for a wholly externalist conception of 
epistemic value, as the last ‘ought’ is the ought that urges us 
to eliminate itself. (Lockie 2018, 119)  
  
Lockie doesn’t provide further explanations of the nature of the claim that 
is made here, so one is left with several questions: What is exactly the “last 
‘ought’”? And what does it mean that “the last ‘ought’ is the ought that 
urges us to eliminate itself?”.  
  
In what follows I shall read Lockie’s point in the last quoted passage as 
expressing the endorsement of CommitmentEO. According to this reading 
of the argument, Lockie is suggesting that in arguing for the abandonment 
of an ought-based epistemology one is thereby committing herself to the 
existence of epistemic obligations. So, coming back to IETAF, according 
to this reading of IA the determinist is someone who is arguing for the 
abandonment of an ought-based epistemology, and by so arguing she is 
committed to the existence of epistemic obligations. 
 
 
6. No Commitment to Epistemic Obligations 
 
In order to assess whether CommitmentEO is true I shall rely on the 
following quite liberal understanding of how judgment’s commitments 
work. A subject’s judgment that p is committed to the truth of some 
proposition q (if and) only if it is not rational (or possible) for the subject 
to judge that p while she is at the same time judging that q is false or 
while she is at the same time open-minded as to whether q is true or not. 
We can then test a candidate judgment’s commitment to judge that q by 
 
18 Lockie (2018, 118). 
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asking whether it would be rational (or possible) for the subject to judge 
that p while also judging that q is false (or while also being open-minded 
as to whether q is true). If it is rational (or possible) to judge that q is false 
(or to be open-minded as to whether q is true) while judging that p, then in 
judging that p one is not thereby committed to judge that q. On the other 
hand, if it is not rational (or possible) to judge that q is false (or to be open-
minded as to whether q is true) while judging that p, then we have 
(arguably conclusive) grounds to conclude that in judging that p we are 
committed to judge that q.  
  
To illustrate, it would not be rational (or even possible) for a subject to 
judge that p while at the same time judging that there are no evidential 
grounds whatsoever for p.  There is something Moore-paradoxical in 
judging that p and that there are no evidential grounds for p. For, if there 
are no evidential grounds for p, then from the subject’s first personal point 
of view it is entirely arbitrary to regard p as true (as opposed to any other 
proposition incompatible with p). This provides evidence for taking it that 
in judging that p one is thereby committed to take it that there are 
evidential grounds for p.19   
  
With this understanding of judgment’s commitments in mind, we can test 
the various interpretations of CommitmentEO. We get two versions of 
CommitmentEO by distinguishing between doxastic and cognitive 
obligations:  
  
CommitmentDO: In judging determinism to be true, the determinist is 
thereby committed to take it that there are doxastic obligations.   
  
CommitmentCO: In judging determinism to be true, the determinist is 
thereby committed to take it that there are cognitive obligations.    
  
CommitmentCO seems to fail the commitment test. To appreciate the point, 
contrast these cases: (a) the detective claims that p, and then is asked 
whether there is any evidential ground for taking p to be true; (b) the 
detective claims that p and then is asked whether he has been diligent and 
systematic in his inquiry; (c) the detective claims that p, and then is asked 
whether he ought to be diligent in his inquiry (or whether he is under any 
of the many cognitive obligations that Lockie considers in his detective 
case). In case (a), as we have just seen, it is clear that it would not be 
rational (or even possible) for the detective to judge that p while judging 
that he has no evidential grounds for p (or while being open minded about 
 
19 Compare with Smithies (2012) who proposes a similar argument that appeals to Moore-
paradoxicality and a similar account of how commitments work.  
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whether he possesses evidential grounds for p). In case (b), it would also 
seem not to be rational, for the detective, to judge that he was not diligent 
and systematic in his inquiry, since by so judging he would thereby be in 
a position to doubt whether he genuinely possesses good evidential 
grounds for p. If he had not been diligent and systematic, he might have 
missed some fundamental piece of evidence, or he might have 
misunderstood the available evidence. And if this is the case, his very 
judgment that p is jeopardized, as the detective is in a position to doubt 
whether his grounds for judging that p are good enough. However, and this 
is the crucial point, it is one thing for the detective to judge that he was 
diligent and systematic, and it is another thing for him to judge that 
he ought to be diligent and systematic. These are two separate issues: a 
subject might be diligent and systematic in one’s inquiry, and she might 
end up in a position in which she judges that p on the basis of good 
evidential grounds, and yet she can at the same time deny, for reasons like 
those proposed by the determinist, say, that there is an obligation to be 
diligent and systematic. Thus, it is entirely possible and rational for the 
detective to judge that p, that he possesses good evidential grounds for p, 
that he was diligent and systematic in his inquiry, while also denying that 
he ought to be diligent and systematic in his inquiry. In judging that p we 
do not seem to commit ourselves to the existence of cognitive 
obligations. CommitmentCO fails the commitment test.  
  
When compared to CommitmentCO, CommitmentDO seems to enjoy some 
prima facie plausibility. The intuitive ground for CommitmentDO is that in 
judging that p we seem to be recommending p as the content to be judged, 
and this might be captured by saying that in judging that p we are 
committed to the existence of a doxastic obligation to the effect that one 
ought to judge that p, or something along these lines.  
  
First of all, even if we concede, for the argument’s sake, the prima facie 
plausibility of CommitmentDO, Lockie can’t avail himself of this move. 
For, Lockie endorses doxastic involuntarism, and thus he grants that we 
lack the freedom needed to underpin these doxastic oughts. Therefore, if 
Lockie were suggesting to rely on CommitmentDO for his IETAF, he would 
end up occupying the same self-defeating position that he is attributing to 
the determinist:20 he holds doxastic involuntarism, and yet by holding it he 
is committed to doxastic voluntarism, as he is committed to the existence 
of doxastic obligations which require the sort of freedom posited by 
doxastic voluntarism.    
  
 
20 I will come back to this problem in §9 by referring it to the overall transcendental 
argumentative strategy employed by Lockie.  
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This is a problem which relates to Lockie’s overall view, namely his 
acceptance of doxastic involuntarism and his consequent rejection of 
doxastic obligations. One might wish to endorse this reading of IA either 
by also arguing for doxastic voluntarism, or by denying that there is 
anything problematic in holding the self-defeating stance which Lockie 
occupies.   
  
Be that as it may, CommitmentDO also fails the commitment test. A subject 
might be rational in holding that p while comprehendingly denying that 
she ought to judge that p. Consider case (c) again. In this case, the detective 
might judge that he was diligent and systematic in his inquiry, and he might 
also judge that he possesses good evidential grounds for judging that p. 
However, all of this is compatible with the fact that there is no obligation 
to judge that p. One might reject the existence of such obligation by 
endorsing the impossibility of judging otherwise which is required in order 
for there to be obligations at all (at least in so far as obligations are 
understood within an incompatibilist framework, which is the only one 
pertinent here).21    
  
Moreover, and relatedly, the intuitive ground for CommitmentDO might be 
explained by appealing to normative commitments that do not involve 
obligations. Consider the following:   
  
Judgment’s Commitment to Alethic Correctness (CommitmentAC): in 
judging that p one is thereby committed to take one’s judgment 
that p as correct.  
  
Judgment’s Commitment to Good Evidential Grounds (CommitmentGEG): 
in judging that p one is thereby committed to take it that she possesses 
good evidential grounds for p.   
  
I have argued before that CommitmentGEG is true.22 CommitmentAC is also 
arguably true, as it is reasonable to suppose that competent believers are 
sensitive to the truth of the following principle about the normative 
connection between truth and judgment:  
  
 
21 Notice that judging that it is not the case that one ought to judge that p does not entail 
that one ought not to judge that p. Judging that p and that one ought not to judge that p is 
indeed Moore-paradoxical, but judging that p and that it is not the case that one ought to 
judge that p is not.  
22 See also Smithies (2012) for a similar argument. 
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Alethic Correctness: a judgment that p is correct (if and) only if p is 
true.23  
  
Given CommitmentAC and CommitmentGEG we might capture the intuitive 
thought according to which in judging that determinism is true the 
determinist is also somehow recommending determinism as the view to be 
believed. By judging that determinism is true the determinist is committed 
to the possession of good evidential grounds for so judging. 24  This 
commitment captures the sense in which a determinist is inviting the 
opponent to agree with her, as she is claiming to be judging a proposition 
that is well supported by the evidence, and thus she is claiming that her 
belief is justified, or rational. Moreover, the determinist is also committed 
to take it that it is correct to judge as she does. Thus, in this sense, the 
determinist is recommending the opponent to be a determinist, since to 
judge in determinism is the correct attitude to have with respect to the issue 
whether determinism is true or not. Crucially, none of these normative 
commitments and none of the normative notions they involve (correctness, 
justification, rationality) require the existence of epistemic obligations.  
  
Although I do not claim to have provided a full vindication 
of CommitmentAC and CommitmentGEG, I think that since it is available 
to the determinist to appeal to them in explaining her normative 
commitments, a defender of IETAF must provide arguments to show 
that CommitmentDO is true and can’t take it for granted in her argument 
against the determinist. 
 
 
7. The Last Duty 
 
I have understood epistemic obligations as specific obligations concerning 
what ought to be believed or how one ought to conduct one’s own inquiry, 
and I have asked whether in judging determinism to be true the determinist 
is committed to any such specific epistemic obligation. However, there is 
another way of reading Lockie’s IA.   
  
Lockie argues that there is a single overarching obligation from which all 
other more specific obligations follow.   
  
 
23 See Wright (1992) and Lynch (2009) who take this principle to be an a priori platitude 
or truism about truth. See Ferrari (2018) and the literature referred to therein about the 
variety of understanding of the truth-norm for judgment. 
24 This is also the conclusion of Lockie’s transcendental argument for the ineliminability of 
a non-deontological conception of internalism that I have summarized above. 
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The only fundamental internalist ‘ought’ is (early) 
Chisholm’s ‘primary intellectual duty’ to aim to acquire truth 
and avoid error. That is as much content to the notion of duty 
as internalism as such need make space for. Given such an 
approach to epistemic duty, it becomes optional whether the 
proponents of any particular internalist account wish to 
articulate, at the level of first-order epistemic theory, any 
system of duties, rules, etc. Given that one ought to aim to 
possess truth, developing an account of the means to that end 
then becomes an engineering problem. (Lockie 2018, 111)  
  
Crucially, the only fundamental epistemic duty is not to actually possess 
the truth, 25  but rather to aim to possess it. On this account, being 
epistemically justified is then a matter of doing the best that one can in 
order to fulfil the overall obligation to aim to believe the truth. According 
to this view, there is no need to specify further independent epistemic 
obligations beside the fundamental epistemic duty to aim to believe the 
truth. Arguably, the specific duties that we have in specific cases can all be 
derived from the last duty by asking what ought to be done in order to aim 
to believe the truth – and this is an “engineering problem”.26  
  
With this account in mind, we can now re-read the whole passage in 
which Lockie argues that this overarching duty is ineliminable:   
  
It was stressed above that internalism should be understood 
as a very high-order theory, not the claim that we must be 
operating on a set of first-order rules or obligations … So, the 
crucial question is this: at the very high-order level, is the last, 
most fundamental epistemic ‘ought’ ineliminable, foundational, 
sui generis, or is not? We have to hold that it is ineliminable. 
It is indefensible to suppose we could abandon the last 
epistemic ‘ought’ for a wholly externalist conception of 
epistemic value, as the last ‘ought’ is the ought that urges us 
to eliminate itself. (Lockie 2018, 118-9)   
  
According to the present reading of the argument, the “last most 
fundamental epistemic ‘ought’” is the duty to aim to achieve the truth. To 
abandon the last duty consists in judging that our supposed last duty is not 
a duty at all – and thus that it is false that we ought to aim to believe the 
 
25 For the sake of simplicity, I will speak of the aim to possess/achieve/believe the truth 
only, and will drop the talk of ‘truth maximization’ and ‘error avoidance’, since they are 
not crucial in this context and their omission won’t affect the argument. See Lockie (2018, 
5.1.2) for more on this point. 
26 Lockie (2018, 111-112).  
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truth. Now, with this interpretation in mind, the argument seems to amount 
to the following: in judging that we are not under the obligation to aim 
to believe the truth one is thereby implicitly presupposing that we are under 
the obligation to aim to believe the truth. For, it is in the name of the duty 
to aim to believe the truth that one claims that (it is true that) there is no 
such thing as the duty to aim to achieve the truth. It is in aiming to judge 
the truth about deontology that one eventually ends up judging that there 
is no such thing as the obligation to aim to judge truly. So understood, the 
argument relies on the following specification of CommitmentEO:   
  
Determinist’s Commitment to Last Duty (CommitmentLD): in judging 
determinism to be true, the determinist is committing herself to the 
existence of the last duty, namely to it being the case that we ought to aim 
at achieving the truth.   
  
Is there any prima facie plausibility in the claim that in judging we are 
committed to take it that we ought to aim to achieve the truth?27 One might 
wish to argue for CommitmentLD by noticing that to judge that p is to take 
a commitment towards the truth of p. Moreover, some theorists argue that 
judging aims at truth,28 and on this ground one might argue that since 
judging aims at truth, by issuing a specific judgment (like the judgment in 
determinism) one is thereby committed to the existence of the 
corresponding obligation to aim at truth. However, to aim at X does not 
need to generate a commitment to an obligation to aim at X. Compare with 
archery. By aiming at doing center I am not thereby committed to take it 
that one has an obligation to aim at doing center. It is entirely possible to 
aim at doing center while consciously rejecting any obligation to aim at 
doing center. One might insist that there is a conditional obligation there: 
in so far as you want or have a reason to do archery, you ought to aim at 
doing center. However, one can consistently aim at doing center by taking 
it that doing center is correct, or good (at least in archery), and yet deny 
the existence of obligations (on determinist grounds, say). Analogously, it 
is rational for a subject to aim to believe the truth about free will, to 
eventually conclude that determinism is true, and to reject, on this ground, 
the existence of an obligation to aim at truth, while at the same time 
conceding that her judgment in determinism is correct (CommitmentAC), 
that it is well grounded (CommitmentGEG), and that judging truly is good 
 
27 Lockie argues for the claim that the duty to aim at truth is the fundamental duty, but he 
doesn’t provide any support for CommitmentLD. For the sake of the present argument, I will 
concede Lockie’s claim about what our most fundamental duty is, and will concentrate the 
discussion on CommitmentLD only.  
28 Various understanding of this claim are argued for by Steglich-Petersen (2006), Bird 




or valuable. As we have noticed above, the intuitive ground for the various 
readings of CommitmentEO might be captured by appealing to non-
deontological normative commitments involving the notion of correctness 
and the non-deontological epistemic notions of justification and 
rationality.  
  
A defender of CommitmentLD might understand the last duty as the duty to 
aim at truth while inquiring, and not as the claim that in judging we ought 
to aim at truth. Since the aim of inquiry is to believe truly, one might argue 
that in inquiry we ought to aim at achieving truth and one might further 
argue that we are committed to the existence of this obligation in inquiry. 
But then the claim suffers from the same problem that we noticed in the 
case of CommitmentCO. The last duty is meant to be the source for the sort 
of cognitive obligations that are appealed to in the detective case. We ought 
to be systematic in our search for evidence, say, because we ought to aim 
to achieve the truth, and being systematic is what it takes to aim to achieve 
the truth. But since it is entirely possible to rationally judge that p while 
denying the existence of specific cognitive obligations, it is also rational to 
judge that p while denying the source of specific cognitive obligations. So, 
I conclude, CommitmentLD is false. 
 
 
8. IETAF and Modest Transcendental Arguments 
 
Thus far, I have argued that CommitmentEO is false, and that as a result 
IETAF fails to deliver the conclusion that determinism is self-defeating. In 
concluding the paper, I wish to highlight another important limitation of 
Lockie’s transcendental strategy which arises even if we concede that his 
IETAF succeeds.  
  
Let us suppose, for the argument’s sake, that IETAF succeeds in showing 
that determinism is self-defeating. However, IETAF is compatible with the 
fact that we have good grounds for believing that determinism is true. The 
resulting stance would be such that one is unavoidably committed to 
presuppose the truth of a proposition – the existence of epistemic 
obligations, and therefore the existence of (incompatibilist) 
freedom – even if one appreciates that all the evidence indicates the falsity 
of that proposition. Within this stance, we might keep being confident that 
determinism is true, even if we realise that by being so confident we are 
also presupposing that there is the sort of free will whose existence is 
denied by determinism.   
  
In order to appreciate why this is an important limitation, it is useful to 
locate IETAF in the debate between modest and ambitious transcendental 
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arguments. 29  Ambitious transcendental arguments aim at showing that 
the truth of some proposition p is the condition of possibility for some fact 
that even the sceptical opponent is prepared to accept. Modest 
transcendental arguments aim at showing that to believe in (or have 
some cognitive relation towards) some proposition p is a condition of 
possibility for the fact which is agreed upon by sceptics and non-sceptics 
alike. IETAF belongs to the category of modest transcendental arguments 
since its aim is to show that to presuppose the existence of free will is 
something that we do whenever we judge, and in this sense is a condition 
of possibility of the very activity of judging.  
  
Now, there is an important disanalogy between Lockie’s dialectical 
engagement with the determinist and canonical uses of the 
modest transcendental strategy. Modest transcendental arguments have 
been often explored as viable strategies to respond to a sceptic who is 
challenging the possibility of knowing some proposition p, and not as 
strategies to respond to someone denying the truth of some 
proposition p. To illustrate, modest transcendental arguments have often 
been used in order to respond to the sceptic about the existence of the 
external world.30 Crucially, this sceptic claims that we do not have enough 
grounds (or grounds at all) to believe that the external world exists, but he 
does not argue that we have good grounds to believe that the external world 
doesn’t exist. This is why a modest strategy is (modestly) satisfying in this 
context: because a modest transcendental arguer ends up in a position in 
which she does not have grounds for believing nor does she have grounds 
for disbelieving in the existence of the external world, and yet she is bound 
to believe in its existence as this belief being in place is a condition of 
possibility for some inescapable cognitive activities (like judging, 
experiencing, etc.) whose reality is conceded by the sceptic herself.31 But 
the fight against the determinist is different. To continue the comparison, 
the determinist is like an idealist denying the existence of the external 
world. The determinist is not claiming that we do not have enough reasons 
to settle the question whether there is free will or not. The determinist is 
claiming that free will doesn’t exist, and she takes herself to have good 
 
29 See Stroud (2000), Stern (2017) and the literature referred to therein. 
30 See Stern (2000) and those hinge epistemologists like Strawson (1985), Wright (2004), 
and Coliva (2015) who appeal to Wittgenstein’s remarks in On certainty in order to answer 
to external world scepticism.  
31 Moreover, some modest transcendental arguers go further. Stern (2000) argues that the 
belief in the external world is warranted; Wright (2004) and Coliva (2015) claim that belief 
in the external world enjoys a special kind of non-evidential warrant; Pritchard (2016) 
claims that the proposition that there is an external world is beyond the scope of rational 
evaluation. No such claims are made by the indirect transcendental arguer for freedom. This 
further reinforces the point I am making here about the disanalogy between IETAF and 
modest transcendental arguments against the external world sceptic. 
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grounds for that claim. So, the indirect transcendental arguer for freedom 
will end up endorsing a deeply dissatisfying standpoint:32 even if we can’t 
but presuppose that we possess free will, we have very good reasons – as 
the determinist says – to believe that this unavoidable presupposition is in 
fact false. This standpoint is in no way intellectually reassuring: it rather 
represents our cognitive standpoint like a cage which is structured by false 
unavoidable presuppositions. This might be the truth about our 
condition – although I have offered reasons to think that it is not. But this 
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